






Inner Sense and the Broad Perceptual Model: 
A Reply to Shoemaker
Abstract
In several recent essays, Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspective knowledge lacks cer­
tain central features which parallel the conditions satisfied by ordinary cases of sense per­
ception. In one influential paper, he discusses and criticizes the “broad perceptual” model 
of the nature of introspective knowledge of mental states, the view which claims that our 
introspective awareness of internal facts is analogous to our awareness of facts about the 
external world. This model may be characterized by its conformance to two conditions of 
ordinary perceptual awareness which Shoemaker dubs the causation condition and the inde-
pendence condition. Shoemaker attacks the broad perceptual model by arguing that certain 
mental facts are “self­intimating”, with the implication being that introspective awareness 
of mental states does not satisfy the independence condition, and hence its character is not 
adequately captured by the broad perceptual model. In what follows, I will discuss the main 
arguments of Shoemaker’s essay. I will argue that a broad perceptual model of introspec­
tion can successfully circumvent the central problems he raises; and along the way I will 
develop some criticisms regarding certain aspects of Shoemaker’s positive proposal.
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sation condition and the independence condition. The former states that per-
ceptual beliefs are causally produced (via some reliable causal mechanism) 
by the objects or states of affairs that are perceived. The latter condition as-











ing”	 (although	not	necessarily	 transparent),	with	 the	 implication	being	 that	
introspective	awareness	of	mental	 states	does	not	 satisfy	 the	 independence	














involved	 in	 those	facts.	 (4)	 is	 the	 identification condition: perception gives 
one	information	about	the	object	of	perception	which	enables	one	to	identify	
what	the	object	is	and	to	distinguish	it	from	other	objects.	(5)	is	the	intrinsic 







perception  is  said  to be of exist  independently of  their being perceived.  In 
other	words,	there	is	no	entailment	relation	between	the	perceived	object	and	
that object’s being	perceived	(Shoemaker	1996,	pp.	204–206).	In	defending	
the	broad	perceptual	model,	my	arguments	 for	 the	most	part	will	 focus	on	
these	 last	 two	conditions	–	 the	causation	condition	and	 independence	con-
dition – because  these are  the conditions  that Shoemaker and many others 




























































the	like,	the	notion	of	shifting one’s attention in these cases presupposes the 
outmoded	“act-object”	conception	of	sensations,	along	with	its	unwarranted	
























2. Shoemaker on introspective awareness 










their  contents  seem  to  represent  features  of  the  external  environment  (e.g. 


























perceives	something	 in	 the	world	as	 instantiating	some	property	associated	
with	that	quale.	In	fact,	though,	the	associated	property	is	neither	instantiated	
in	the	external	world	nor	in	the	experience	itself,	but	is	merely	an	aspect	of	
















say  that  the properties one’s experience attributes  to an external object are 
relational	properties	–	that	is,	that	the	“phenomenal	characters”	are	causal­
relational properties. If Jack and Jill are spectrum inverted relative to each 





































Shoemaker  discusses  the  nature  of  appear-
ance	 properties	 in	more	 detail	 in	 (1996,	 pp.	
249–250)	and	also	in	(2002,	p.	468).
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First	of	all,	 there	 is	 the	problem	of	how  instantiations of P­properties help 
cause relevant experiences.7 Q-experiences cannot be caused by external ob-
jects having the property of causing Q­experiences. It doesn’t seem to make 
sense  to  say  that  the  (causal)  disposition  to  produce  effect  E  could  be  the 
cause  of E.	Suppose	my	younger	daughter	 swipes	her	hand	across	 a	 stack	
of	wooden	blocks	made	by	her	older	sister	(who	claims	she	was	building	a	
skyscraper),	knocking	the	blocks	down	and	leveling	the	building.	In	ponder-
ing	 the	metaphysics	 of	 this	 event,	 surely	 it	 is	 not	 the	 property	 of	 causing 








apple looks red to Jack and that a patch of green grass looks green to him. This 
difference  can only  consist  in  the  fact  that  the  relevant P­properties cause 




























object,	instead	of	exemplifying	the	P­property Q* (the property of causing a 
Q­experience in S),	does	not	exemplify	the	P­property T*, or the property of 
causing a T­experience in S?	This	problem	seems	unanswerable	on	Shoemaker’s	
proposal.
Furthermore,	 locating	 the	 “phenomenal	 characters”	 in	 the	 external	 object	
does not alleviate the problem of misrepresentation or misperception of the 
object,	which	is	one	of	Shoemaker’s	primary	motivations	for	rejecting	both	
projectivist models.	Once	 again,	 on	 Shoemaker’s	 account,	 one’s	 particular	
experience represents an object as having a certain relational property R,	a	P­pro­
perty,	which	can	be	defined	as	the disposition to produce a Q­experience in 
S. But in S’s	actual	experience,	neither	the	relational	aspect	nor	the	Q-ness	
itself	is	perceived	or	introspected.	So	when	S looks at a bright red apple and 















up	 of	 certain	 representational	 properties,	 that	 is,	my	 experience	 represents	







































ence  of)  pain  to  be  a  representational  property?  Pain  must  be  represented 
either	conceptually	or	non-conceptually.	Shoemaker	opts	for	the	latter,	claim-





















paradigm difficulty  for his  representational  theory of mental  states and his 
account of our introspective access to them.

















(otherwise	how	could	her	behavior	qualify	as pain behavior at all?). On the 
other	hand,	if	we	assume	that	she	has	no	dislike	for	the	pain	and	engages	in	









































In	 Shoemaker’s	 view	 of	 perceptual	 experi-
ence,	 the	 immediate	 perceptual	 judgment(s)	














































4. In defense of the broad perceptual model
As	I	see	it,	there	are	several	significant	weaknesses	in	Shoemaker’s	critique	
of	the	broad	perceptual	model.	I	begin	with	his	arguments	against	introspec-











tions,	 and	 these	 states	 play	 their	 appropriate	 causal	 roles	 in	 responding	 to	


































inner	awareness,	 I	do	not	 find	 it	 incoherent	 to	 suppose	 that	 there	could	be	
creatures,	with	rational	and	 intellectual	capacities	comparable	 to	ours,	who	
have	no	such	 inner	awareness.	As	 long	as	such	creatures	can	have	 internal	
states	which	 (i)	 realize	 the	property	of	being a sensation of painfulness or 
9
Shoemaker	 (1996,	 pp.	 238–239).	 He	 later	
employs the same line of thought in reference 
to desiring and wanting. Because similar re-
marks  apply  both  in  the  cases  of  belief  and 
desire,	 I	have	chosen	 to	 follow	 the	example	
he uses of belief.
10
Shoemaker  briefly  sketches  an  additional 
argument  against  this  type  of  self-blindness 
(1996,	 p.	 240),	 which	 goes	 roughly	 as	 fol-
lows:	 it	 seems	 that	 in	 order	 for	 us	 to	make	
conscious,	rational	revisions	and	adjustments	


























ment,	 the	kind	of	“access”	 to	experiences	 that	 is	 required	 in	order	 to	 form	
normal	perceptual	judgments	and	to	engage	in	the	sort	of	low	level	theoriz-
ing	he	speaks	of	is	at	best	a	very	weak	form	of	“awareness”	analogous	to	a	



























this	 form	 of	 access	 qualify	 as	 genuine	 introspection?	And	 even	 if	 it	 does,	



































ing	originally	derived	 from	early	Freudian	 theory,	 significant	 experimental	
data	compiled	by	cognitive	psychologists	have	shown	fairly	conclusively	that	
human	beings	can	possess	a	whole	range	of	mental	states,	including	beliefs	


























qualify	 as	 a	pain	 state	 any	 state	which	does	
















like?	We	may	distinguish	between	occurrent beliefs,	actual but non­occurrent 
beliefs,	and	implicit beliefs. A rough characterization of such beliefs can be 
given	as	follows.	A	subject	S holds an occurrent belief that P if it is true that S 
is	now	thinking	that P. S holds an actual but non-occurrent belief that P if S is 
not	now	thinking	that P but S	would	explicitly	affirm	that p	without	inference	
if posed the question “Do you believe  that P?”	Finally,	S holds an implicit 










belief  states  to an A­type awareness	of	 those	states.	But	because	a	 rational	
agent’s belief that she believes that P, and hence any rational explanation of 
her	relevant	behavior,	only	requires	that	this	second-order	belief	be	non-oc-
current,	it	is	entirely	consistent	to	suppose	that	that	she	is	not	self-aware	with	







plausibility  of  the  independence  condition.  Having  particular  second  order 









weather	conditions.	 It	 is	 implausible	 to	argue	 that	 this	higher	order	aware-
ness of my first-order desire merely consists in having that desire plus having 















she (occurrently) believes that P just is her (occurrent) belief that P.	(We	shall	
say that she has the second order belief that she O-believes that P.) In order 





































degree of intelligence and rationality; thus S’s believing that S believes that P 










The	 criticisms	 I	 offer	 in	 this	 section	 will	
equally apply to other intentional states such 


















only  to A­type introspection.	But	 as	 I	 argued	above,	his	 arguments	 against	
self-blindness depend exclusively on this very notion of introspection. One 
consequence of  this  is  that Shoemaker’s account as presented rules out  the 
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Unutarnji osjet i široki perceptualni model: 
odgovor Shoemakeru
Sažetak
U nekolicini recentnih tekstova, Sydney Shoemaker tvrdi da introspektivnom znanju nedostaju 
određene ključne centralne značajke koje odgovaraju uvjetima zadovoljenima u običnim sluča­
jevima osjetilne percepcije. U jednom utjecajnom radu on razmatra i kritizira »široki percep­
tualni« model prirode introspektivnog znanja mentalnih stanja, stajalište koje tvrdi da je naša 
introspektivna svijest unutrašnjih činjenica analogna našoj svijesti o činjenicama izvanjskoga 
svijeta. Ovaj model može biti okarakteriziran njegovom sukladnošću dvama uvjetima obične 
perceptivne svijesti koje Shoemaker naziva uvjet kauzacije i uvjet neovisnosti. Shoemaker na­
pada široki perceptualni model tvrdeći da su određene mentalne činjenice »samozadane«, im­
plicirajući da introspektivna svijest o mentalnim stanjima ne zadovoljava uvjet neovisnosti, te 
stoga njen karakter nije adekvatno obuhvaćen širokim perceptualnim modelom. U onome što 
slijedi razmotrit ću glavne argumente Shoemakerovoga rada. Tvrdim da široki perceptualni 
model introspekcije može uspješno zaobići centralne problem koje on ističe; i usput ću razviti 




Innerer Sinn und breites perzeptives Modell: 
Gegenrede zu Shoemaker
Zusammenfassung
In ein paar rezenten Essays postuliert Sydney Shoemaker, das introspektive Wissen ermangele 
gewisser zentraler Spezifika, die den in herkömmlichen Fällen der Sinneswahrnehmung er­
füllten Umständen gleichkommen. In einem wirkungsreichen Paper behandelt und kritisiert er 
das „breite perzeptive“ Modell der Natur des introspektiven Wissens von Mentalzuständen, 
eine Betrachtungsweise, die besagt, unser introspektives Bewusstsein der internen Tatsachen sei 
übereinstimmend mit unserem Bewusstsein der Tatsachen über die Außenwelt. Dieses Modell 
lässt sich aufgrund seiner Deckungsgleichheit mit zwei Voraussetzungen des ordinären perzep­
tiven Bewusstseins illustrieren, die Shoemaker Bedingung der Kausalität bzw. Bedingung der 
Unabhängigkeit nennt. Shoemaker attackiert das breite perzeptive Modell, indem er bekräfti­
gt, bestimmte mentale Fakten seien „selbstimplizierend“; zudem befriedige das introspektive 
Bewusstsein der Mentalzustände nicht die Bedingung der Unabhängigkeit, weswegen dessen 
Charakterzug inadäquat vom breiten perzeptiven Modell umfasst werde. Im Folgenden gehe 
ich die Hauptargumente von Shoemakers Essay durch. Ich stelle die Behauptung auf, das breite 
perzeptive Modell der Introspektion könne die von ihm aufgeworfenen Kernprobleme erfolg­










Le sens intérieur et le modèle perceptuel large : 
la réponse à Shoemaker
Résumé
Dans plusieurs essais récents, Sydney Shoemaker affirme que la connaissance introspective est 
dépourvue de certaines caractéristiques centrales correspondant aux conditions qui, elles, sont 
remplies dans les cas ordinaires de perception sensorielle. Dans un article influent, il examine 
et critique le modèle « perceptuel large » de la nature de la connaissance introspective des états 
mentaux, une position qui affirme que notre conscience introspective des faits internes est ana­
logue à notre conscience des faits du monde externe. Ce modèle peut se définir par sa confor­
mité à deux conditions de la conscience perceptuelle ordinaire que Shoemaker appelle condition 
de  causation et condition  d’indépendance. Shoemaker attaque d’abord le modèle perceptuel 
large en affirmant que certains faits mentaux se « laissent entendre d’eux­mêmes », impliquant 
que la conscience introspective des états mentaux ne remplit pas la condition d’indépendance 
et que, par conséquent, son caractère n’est pas saisi de manière adéquate par le modèle per­
ceptuel large. Dans ce qui suit, j’examinerai les principaux arguments de l’essai de Shoemaker. 
J’affirmerai qu’un modèle perceptuel large de l’introspection peut contourner avec réussite les 
problèmes centraux qu’il soulève ; ce faisant, je développerai quelques critiques à l’égard de 
certains aspects de la proposition positive de Shoemaker.
Mots-clés
sens	intérieur,	conscience,	introspection,	connaissance	de	soi,	caractère	phénoménal,	expérience	per-
ceptuelle
